社会科学研究基础平台关于实验经济学学术讲座的通知

题    目：Trust and Trustworthiness Reputations in an Investment Game
主讲人：杜宁华  上海财经大学经济学实验室主任、博士生导师
时  间：2010年4月16日（周五）下午1时30分
地  点：紫金港东三108会议室（社会科学研究基础平台会议室）

主讲人简介：
     杜宁华，现任上海财经大学经济学实验室主任、博士生导师，于2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位。亚利桑那大学的经济科学实验室是北美最早成立的实验经济学研究基地，由2002年诺贝尔经济学奖得主Vernon Smith创建。由于杜宁华的加盟，上海财经大学增设了实验经济学专业的博士点。杜宁华博士的研究领域主攻实验经济学，致力于用实验手段回答各种与市场机制相关的问题。

讲座摘要：
    Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance.  This is particularly true in environments such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or standard public-goods games, where the equilibrium in a one-shot case involves strictly uncooperative behavior. Evolutionary biologists have developed the notion of indirect reciprocity, whereby favorable or unfavorable actions by one person towards a second person are rewarded or punished by a third party.  In this view, indirect reciprocity is a strategic notion based on reputation and is sustainable in an evolutionary sense.  In this paper, we study the effect of different reputation systems.  In the History of Return treatment, we make information available to the first mover in a binary ‘trust’ game about the past behavior of the responder as a responder.  In the novel History of Trust treatment, we alternatively make information available about the behavior of the responder as a first mover.  We find an identical and substantial increase in ‘trust’ for both of these reputation systems in comparison to the baseline no-information treatment, even though ‘trustworthiness’ is relatively low in the History of Trust treatment.  Thus, people still find it worthwhile to invest in reputation as someone who is willing to trust, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is poor.


                                                                                 社会科学研究基础平台
                                                                             个体行为与社会现象实验室
                                                                                        2010年4月14日